Recent Changes

Tuesday, January 14

  1. page Detailed Content edited On this page, you find all the materials (slides, handouts, assignments) organized chronologica…

    On this page, you find all the materials (slides, handouts, assignments) organized chronologically. Most importantly, the columns "Important notions/methods" summarize for each lectures the particular definition and method that you need to digest, and will be used in assignments and exams.
    Preliminary
    ...
    Important notions/methods
    Readings and Materials
    September 4th
    Welcome to the class
    Motivation for new works on social network economics
    What's in the class, and should you take it?
    Slides {SNE13-0Welcome.pdf}
    ||
    Part A - Opinion and Influence Dynamics
    Part A.1 - The crowd is wise
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    September 11th
    Consensus, Social learning
    ...
    and Results
    Epidemics, Influence, Opinion
    Iterated Consensus, Naive learning
    September 18th
    Wisdom of the crowd
    ...
    and Results
    Uniformly prominent family,
    Balanced, Minimal Dispersion
    ...
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    September 25th
    Manipulation
    ...
    and Results
    Biased

    Biased
    and Stubborn agents,
    Agreement as minimizing cost
    October 2nd
    Analysis of manipulation
    Laplacian, Random Walk and Hitting time
    ||
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-2Manipulation.pdf} ,
    ...
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    October 9th
    Information Selection
    Homophily, Biased assimilation, Fragmentation, Polarization
    Influence System
    ||
    October
    October 16th
    Convergence of influence system
    Total s-energy, Potential function
    ||
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-3Selection.pdf} ,
    ...
    Important notions/methods
    Readings and Materials
    October 24th
    Allocating Indivisible Goods over Networks
    Matching Market, Buyer-Seller Network, Trading Agents
    ||
    October
    October 31th
    Allocating

    Allocating
    Divisible Goods over Networks
    Some words on elastic demand
    Arrow Debreu Theorem, Graphical Economies,
    Bertrand Competition
    ||
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-4SupplyDemand.pdf} ,
    ...
    L. Blume, D. Easley, and J. M. Kleinberg, “Trading networks with price-setting agents,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2009.
    Divisible goods
    ...
    appeared as S. S. M. Kakade,
    Other Results Explained in Class:
    M. Corominas-Bosch, “Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 115, no. 1, pp. 35–77, Mar. 2004.
    ...
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    November 13th
    Motivations, Definitions
    Procurement, Purchase,
    Income elasticity of demand, normal goods
    ||
    November
    November 20th
    Outcome of Social Good games
    Adjacency matrix and Bonacich centrality
    Proof of Unicity of equilibrium under network normality
    ||
    November
    November 27th
    Provision of Social Goods
    Redistribution, Neutrality principle
    Proof it holds for regular networks
    ||
    December 4th
    Catch-up and other
    Social goods with complements
    Monopolist pricing
    ||
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-5SocialGoods.pdf} ,
    (view changes)
    7:01 pm
  2. page Detailed Content edited DETAILED MATERIALS & RESOURCE FOR THE CLASS (Please visit On this page often as this is …

    DETAILED MATERIALS & RESOURCE FOR THE CLASS
    (Please visit
    On this page often as this ispage, you find all the main one that is updated regularly).
    Lecture "ZERO":
    Date
    Title
    Important notions covered
    Tuesday, January 21st
    Lecture "ZERO"
    Why take or NOT take this class?
    What are
    materials (slides, handouts, assignments) organized chronologically. Most importantly, the objective of CSEE 4119?
    What are
    columns "Important notions/methods" summarize for each lectures the prerequisites?
    What
    particular definition and method that you need to dodigest, and will be used in assignments and exams.
    Preliminary
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    Readings and Materials
    September 4th
    Welcome
    to pass it?
    Meet your instructor.
    Documents
    the class
    Motivation
    for this part:
    Slides: {2014CS4119-0Welcome.pdf}
    Recommended reading:
    [1] S. Biddle, “How to Destroy
    new works on social network economics
    What's in
    the Internet,” gizmodo.com.
    [Online]. http://gizmodo.com/5912383/how-to-destroy-the-internet. [23-May-2012]
    [2] “The world is what
    class, and should you make it,”take it?
    Slides {SNE13-0Welcome.pdf}
    ||
    Part A - Opinion and Influence Dynamics
    Part A.1 -
    The Economist, 27-Oct-2012.
    [Online]. Available: http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21565002-every-country-has-its-own-internet-world-what-you-make-it.
    [3] J. Markoff, "Viewing Where
    crowd is wise
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    September 11th
    Consensus, Social learning
    Terminology and Results
    Epidemics, Influence, Opinion
    Iterated Consensus, Naive learning
    September 18th
    Wisdom of
    the Internet Goes,"crowd
    Terminology and Results
    Uniformly prominent family,
    Balanced, Minimal Dispersion
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-1Consensus.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    M. H. Degroot, “Reaching a Consensus,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 69, no. 345, pp. 118–121, Mar. 1974.
    P. M. DeMarzo, D. Vayanos, and J. Zwiebel, “Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions,”
    The New York Times (12/30/13)
    [Online]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/31/science/viewing-where-the-internet-goes.html
    Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 118, no. 3, pp. 909–968, Aug. 2003.
    B. Golub and M. O. Jackson, “Naive learning in social networks and the wisdom of crowds,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 112–149, 2010.

    Part IA.2 - Overview: Internet seen from 10,000 feetThe crowd can't seem to agree
    Date
    Title
    & Title
    Important concepts to assimilate
    Reading
    notions/methods
    September 25th
    Manipulation
    Terminology
    and Slides
    Tuesday, January 21st
    Overview (1):
    The Internet, Its Edge
    Results
    Biased
    and Its Core
    end-host, access network, packet switching
    Kurose-Ross (sect. 1.1-1.3)
    Thursday, January 23rd
    Overview (2):
    Performance, Protocol Layering, Network security
    delay, loss, throughput,
    layers, encapsulation
    Tuesday, January 28th
    Review
    Stubborn agents,
    Agreement as minimizing cost
    October 2nd
    Analysis of manipulation
    Laplacian, Random Walk
    and Catch-up
    Documents for this part:
    Assignment 1 (due
    Hitting time
    ||
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-2Manipulation.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    J. Ghaderi and R. Srikant, “Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks: A Local Interaction Game with Stubborn Agents,” ACC '13: Proceedings of the American Control Conference, vol. cs.GT. 2013.
    D. Bindel, J. M. Kleinberg, and S. Oren, “How Bad is Forming Your Own Opinion?,” Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on, pp. 57–66, 2011.
    Other results explained in class:
    D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, and A. ParandehGheibi, “Spread of (mis) information in social networks,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 70, no. 2, pp. 194–227, 2010.
    D. Acemoglu, G. Como, F. Fagnani, and A. Ozdaglar, “Opinion fluctuations and disagreement in social networks,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 1–27, 2013.
    E. Yildiz, D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, A. Saberi, and A. Scaglione, "Binary Opinion Dynamics with Stubborn Agents," ACM Transactions
    on Tuesday February 4th): Upcoming
    Part II - Application: Network
    Economics and Computation, 2013. (previously appeared as a service,“Discrete opinion dynamics with stubborn agents,” SSRN 1744113, 2011).
    Further Reading & Recent works:
    K. Bhawalkar, S. Gollapudi,
    and how to use it
    Upcoming
    K. Munagala, “Coevolutionary opinion formation games,” presented at the STOC '13: Proceedings of the 45th annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing, 2013.
    F. Chierichetti, J. M. Kleinberg, and S. Oren, “On discrete preferences and coordination,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.

    Part IIIA.3 - Transport: The artcrowd is selective
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    October 9th
    Information Selection
    Homophily, Biased assimilation, Fragmentation, Polarization
    Influence System
    ||
    October 16th
    Convergence of influence system
    Total s-energy, Potential function
    ||
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-3Selection.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    C. G. Lord, L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper, “Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence.,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 37, no. 11, p. 2098, Nov. 1979.
    J. Lorenz, “A stabilization theorem for dynamics of continuous opinions,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 355, no. 1, pp. 217–223, 2005.
    A. Bhattacharyya, M. Braverman, B. Chazelle, and H. L. Nguyen, “On the convergence of the Hegselmann-Krause system,” presented at the ITCS '13: Proceedings of the 4th conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2013.
    Other Results Explained in Class:
    B. Chazelle, “The total s-energy
    of improving a multiagent system,” SIAM J. Control Optim., vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 1680–1706, 2011.
    Further Reading & Recents Works:
    On polarization dynamics and the effects of recommender systems
    P. Dandekar, A. Goel, and D. T. Lee, “Biased assimilation, homophily, and the dynamics of polarization.,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 110, no. 15, pp. 5791–5796, Apr. 2013.
    On migration-cultural adoption
    R. Axelrod, “The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with Local Convergence and Global Polarization,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 203–226, Apr. 1997.
    D. Kempe, J. M. Kleinberg, S. Oren, and A. Slivkins, “Selection and influence in cultural dynamics,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    On
    network fromwith antagonistic relations and structural balance:
    S. Marvel, S. Strogatz, and J. M. Kleinberg, “Energy landscape of social balance,” Physical review letters, vol. 103, no. 19, p. 198701, 2009.
    S. A. Marvel, J. M. Kleinberg, R. Kleinberg, and S. H. Strogatz, “Continuous-time model of structural balance,” Proceedings of
    the ends
    Upcoming
    National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 108, no. 5, pp. 1771–1776, 2011.
    C. Altafini, “Consensus Problems on Networks With Antagonistic Interactions,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 935–946, Apr. 2013.
    G. Shi, A. Proutiere, M. Johansson, J. S. Baras, and K. H. Johansson, “The Evolution of Beliefs over Signed Social Networks,” arXiv.org, Jul. 2013.

    Part IVB - Network: Finding where to go and how to make it there
    Upcoming
    Graphical Economies
    Part VB.1 - Link: Finding out who will speak
    Upcoming
    Other references
    Tanenbaum-Wetherall refers to:
    Computer Networks, 5th edition,
    Trading with network constraints
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    Readings and Materials
    October 24th
    Allocating Indivisible Goods over Networks
    Matching Market, Buyer-Seller Network, Trading Agents
    ||
    October 31th
    Allocating Divisible Goods over Networks
    Some words on elastic demand
    Arrow Debreu Theorem, Graphical Economies,
    Bertrand Competition
    ||
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-4SupplyDemand.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    Allocation of indivisible goods
    L.
    S. Tanenbaum, DavidShapley and M. Shubik, “The assignment game I: The core,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 111–130, 1971.
    R. Kranton and D. Minehart, “Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks,” Review of Economic Design, 2000.
    R. E. Kranton and D. F. Minehart, “A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks,” The American Economic Review, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 485–508, Jun. 2001.
    L. Blume, D. Easley, and
    J. Wetherall, Prentice Hall, 2011
    ISBN-10: 0132126958, ISBN-13: 978-132126953
    Peterson-Davie refers to:
    Computer Networks, A
    M. Kleinberg, “Trading networks with price-setting agents,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2009.
    Divisible goods
    S. M. Kakade, M. Kearns, and L. E. Ortiz, “Graphical Economics,” presented at the International Conference on Learning Theory (COLT), Berlin, Heidelberg, 2004, vol. 3120, no. 2, pp. 17–32. (Also appeared as S. M. Kakade, M. Kearns, L. E. Ortiz, R. Pemantle, and S. Suri, “Economic properties of social networks,” Advances in Neural Information Processing
    Systems Approach, 5th edition,(NIPS), pp. 633–640, 2004. and as S. Kakade, M. Kearns, L. Peterson, Bruce Davie, Morgan Kaufmann, 2011
    ISBN: 9780123850591
    Bertsekas-Gallager refers to:
    Data Networks, 2th edition,
    Ortiz, and R. Pemantle, “The economics of social networks,” presented at the The 15th Annual International Conference on Game Theory, 2004.)
    Other Results Explained in Class:
    M. Corominas-Bosch, “Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 115, no. 1, pp. 35–77, Mar. 2004.
    C. L. Guzmán, “Price Competition on Network,” working paper, 2011.
    M. Babaioff, B. Lucier, and N. Nisan, “Bertrand networks,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    Further Reading & Recents Works:
    M. Babaioff, N. Nisan, and E. Pavlov, “Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 660–684, Jul. 2009.
    Part B.2 - The theory of social goods
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    November 13th
    Motivations, Definitions
    Procurement, Purchase,
    Income elasticity of demand, normal goods
    ||
    November 20th
    Outcome of Social Good games
    Adjacency matrix and Bonacich centrality
    Proof of Unicity of equilibrium under network normality
    ||
    November 27th
    Provision of Social Goods
    Redistribution, Neutrality principle
    Proof it holds for regular networks
    ||
    December 4th
    Catch-up and other
    Social goods with complements
    Monopolist pricing
    ||
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-5SocialGoods.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    Various scenarios of social goods
    Y. Bramoullé and R. Kranton, “Public goods in networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 135, no. 1, pp. 478–494, Jul. 2006.
    Y. Bramoullé, R. Kranton, and M. D'Amours, “Strategic interaction and networks,” American Economic Review (forthcoming), 2013.
    Provision, tax and neutrality
    T. Bergstrom, L. Blume, and H. Varian, “On the private provision of public goods,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 25–49, Feb. 1986.
    N. Allouch, “On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks,” working paper, 2012.
    Other Results Explained in Class:
    More examples of public goods
    C. Ballester, A. Calvó-Armengol, and Y. Zenou, “Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player,” Econometrica, vol. 74, no. 5, pp. 1403–1417, Sep. 2006.
    C. Ghiglino and S. Goyal, “Keeping up with the neighbors: social interaction in a market economy,” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 90–119, 2010.
    Pricing a social good
    O. Candogan, K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar, “Optimal pricing in networks with externalities,” Operations Research, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 883–905, 2012.
    F. Bloch and N. Quérou, “Pricing in social networks,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 80, pp. 243–261, Jul. 2013.
    M. Feldman,
    D. Bertsekas,Kempe, B. Lucier, and R. Gallager, Prentice Hall, 1992
    ISBN-10: 0132009161, ISBN-13: 978-0132009164
    P. Leme, “Pricing public goods for private sale,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    Further Reading & Recents Works:
    Variants of social good games: incomplete information, endogenous network
    A. Galeotti, S. Goyal, M. O. Jackson, F. Vega-Redondo, and L. Yariv, “Network games,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 218–244, 2010.
    A. Galeotti and S. Goyal, “The law of the few,” American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 4, pp. 1468–1492, 2010.
    More on the provision of social goods
    N. Allouch, “The Cost of Segregation in Social Networks,” SSRN Journal, 2013.
    M. Elliott and B. Golub, “A network approach to public goods,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    Pricing a social spread of influence
    J. Hartline, V. Mirrokni, and M. Sundararajan, “Optimal marketing strategies over social networks,” presented at the WWW '08: Proceeding of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web, New York, New York, USA, 2008, pp. 189–198.
    D. Arthur, R. Motwani, A. Sharma, and Y. Xu, “Pricing strategies for viral marketing on social networks,” WINE '09: Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, pp. 101–112, 2009.
    H. Akhlaghpour, M. Ghodsi, N. Haghpanah, V. Mirrokni, H. Mahini, and A. Nikzad, “Optimal iterative pricing over social networks,” presented at the WINE '10: Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics, 2010, pp. 415–423.
    V. Mirrokni, S. Roch, and M. Sundararajan, “On Fixed-Price Marketing for Goods with Positive Network Externalities.,” WINE '12: Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, Dec. 2012.
    Variants of spread of influence
    Y. Singer, “How to win friends and influence people, truthfully: influence maximization mechanisms for social networks,” WSDM '12: Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining, pp. 733–742, 2012.
    N. Alon, I. Gamzu, and M. Tennenholtz, “Optimizing budget allocation among channels and influencers,” presented at the WWW '12: Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web, 2012.
    L. Seeman and Y. Singer, “Adaptive Seeding in Social Networks,” FOCS '13: Proceedings of the 43th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
    More recent works
    M. Wunder, S. Suri, and D. J. Watts, “Empirical agent based models of cooperation in public goods games,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    N. Alon, Y. Mansour, and M. Tenneholtz, “Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networks,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.

    (view changes)
    7:00 pm
  3. page Detailed Content edited On DETAILED MATERIALS & RESOURCE FOR THE CLASS (Please visit this page, you find all pa…

    OnDETAILED MATERIALS & RESOURCE FOR THE CLASS
    (Please visit
    this page, you find allpage often as this is the materials (slides, handouts, assignments) organized chronologically. Most importantly,main one that is updated regularly).
    Lecture "ZERO":
    Date
    Title
    Important notions covered
    Tuesday, January 21st
    Lecture "ZERO"
    Why take or NOT take this class?
    What are
    the columns "Important notions/methods" summarize for each lecturesobjective of CSEE 4119?
    What are
    the particular definition and method thatprerequisites?
    What
    you need to digest, and will be used in assignments and exams.
    Preliminary
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    Readings and Materials
    September 4th
    Welcome
    do to the class
    Motivation
    pass it?
    Meet your instructor.
    Documents
    for new works on social network economics
    What's in
    this part:
    Slides: {2014CS4119-0Welcome.pdf}
    Recommended reading:
    [1] S. Biddle, “How to Destroy
    the class, and shouldInternet,” gizmodo.com.
    [Online]. http://gizmodo.com/5912383/how-to-destroy-the-internet. [23-May-2012]
    [2] “The world is what
    you take it?
    Slides {SNE13-0Welcome.pdf}
    Part A - Opinion and Influence Dynamics
    Part A.1 -
    make it,” The crowd is wise
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    September 11th
    Consensus, Social learning
    Terminology and Results
    Epidemics, Influence, Opinion
    Iterated Consensus, Naive learning
    September 18th
    Wisdom of
    Economist, 27-Oct-2012.
    [Online]. Available: http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21565002-every-country-has-its-own-internet-world-what-you-make-it.
    [3] J. Markoff, "Viewing Where
    the crowd
    Terminology and Results
    Uniformly prominent family,
    Balanced, Minimal Dispersion
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-1Consensus.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    M. H. Degroot, “Reaching a Consensus,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 69, no. 345, pp. 118–121, Mar. 1974.
    P. M. DeMarzo, D. Vayanos, and J. Zwiebel, “Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions,”
    Internet Goes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 118, no. 3, pp. 909–968, Aug. 2003.
    B. Golub and M. O. Jackson, “Naive learning in social networks and the wisdom of crowds,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 112–149, 2010.
    New York Times (12/30/13)
    [Online]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/31/science/viewing-where-the-internet-goes.html

    Part A.2I - The crowd can't seem to agreeOverview: Internet seen from 10,000 feet
    Date & Title
    Title

    Important notions/methods
    September 25th
    Manipulation
    Terminology
    concepts to assimilate
    Reading
    and Results
    Biased
    Slides
    Tuesday, January 21st
    Overview (1):
    The Internet, Its Edge
    and Stubborn agents,
    Agreement as minimizing cost
    October 2nd
    Analysis of manipulation
    Laplacian, Random Walk
    Its Core
    end-host, access network, packet switching
    Kurose-Ross (sect. 1.1-1.3)
    Thursday, January 23rd
    Overview (2):
    Performance, Protocol Layering, Network security
    delay, loss, throughput,
    layers, encapsulation
    Tuesday, January 28th
    Review
    and Hitting time
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-2Manipulation.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    J. Ghaderi and R. Srikant, “Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks: A Local Interaction Game with Stubborn Agents,” ACC '13: Proceedings of the American Control Conference, vol. cs.GT. 2013.
    D. Bindel, J. M. Kleinberg, and S. Oren, “How Bad is Forming Your Own Opinion?,” Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on, pp. 57–66, 2011.
    Other results explained in class:
    D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, and A. ParandehGheibi, “Spread of (mis) information in social networks,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 70, no. 2, pp. 194–227, 2010.
    D. Acemoglu, G. Como, F. Fagnani, and A. Ozdaglar, “Opinion fluctuations and disagreement in social networks,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 1–27, 2013.
    E. Yildiz, D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, A. Saberi, and A. Scaglione, "Binary Opinion Dynamics with Stubborn Agents," ACM Transactions
    Catch-up
    Documents for this part:
    Assignment 1 (due
    on Economics and Computation, 2013. (previously appearedTuesday February 4th): Upcoming
    Part II - Application: Network
    as “Discrete opinion dynamics with stubborn agents,” SSRN 1744113, 2011).
    Further Reading & Recent works:
    K. Bhawalkar, S. Gollapudi,
    a service, and K. Munagala, “Coevolutionary opinion formation games,” presented at the STOC '13: Proceedings of the 45th annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing, 2013.
    F. Chierichetti, J. M. Kleinberg, and S. Oren, “On discrete preferences and coordination,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    how to use it
    Upcoming

    Part A.3III - Transport: The crowd is selective
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    October 9th
    Information Selection
    Homophily, Biased assimilation, Fragmentation, Polarization
    Influence System
    October 16th
    Convergence of influence system
    Total s-energy, Potential function
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-3Selection.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    C. G. Lord, L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper, “Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence.,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 37, no. 11, p. 2098, Nov. 1979.
    J. Lorenz, “A stabilization theorem for dynamics of continuous opinions,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 355, no. 1, pp. 217–223, 2005.
    A. Bhattacharyya, M. Braverman, B. Chazelle, and H. L. Nguyen, “On the convergence of the Hegselmann-Krause system,” presented at the ITCS '13: Proceedings of the 4th conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2013.
    Other Results Explained in Class:
    B. Chazelle, “The total s-energy
    art of improving a multiagent system,” SIAM J. Control Optim., vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 1680–1706, 2011.
    Further Reading & Recents Works:
    On polarization dynamics and the effects of recommender systems
    P. Dandekar, A. Goel, and D. T. Lee, “Biased assimilation, homophily, and the dynamics of polarization.,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 110, no. 15, pp. 5791–5796, Apr. 2013.
    On migration-cultural adoption
    R. Axelrod, “The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with Local Convergence and Global Polarization,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 203–226, Apr. 1997.
    D. Kempe, J. M. Kleinberg, S. Oren, and A. Slivkins, “Selection and influence in cultural dynamics,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    On
    network with antagonistic relations and structural balance:
    S. Marvel, S. Strogatz, and J. M. Kleinberg, “Energy landscape of social balance,” Physical review letters, vol. 103, no. 19, p. 198701, 2009.
    S. A. Marvel, J. M. Kleinberg, R. Kleinberg, and S. H. Strogatz, “Continuous-time model of structural balance,” Proceedings of
    from the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 108, no. 5, pp. 1771–1776, 2011.
    C. Altafini, “Consensus Problems on Networks With Antagonistic Interactions,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 935–946, Apr. 2013.
    G. Shi, A. Proutiere, M. Johansson, J. S. Baras, and K. H. Johansson, “The Evolution of Beliefs over Signed Social Networks,” arXiv.org, Jul. 2013.
    ends
    Upcoming

    Part BIV - Graphical EconomiesNetwork: Finding where to go and how to make it there
    Upcoming

    Part B.1V - Trading with network constraints
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    Readings and Materials
    October 24th
    Allocating Indivisible Goods over Networks
    Matching Market, Buyer-Seller Network, Trading Agents
    October 31th
    Allocating Divisible Goods over Networks
    Some words on elastic demand
    Arrow Debreu Theorem, Graphical Economies,
    Bertrand Competition
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-4SupplyDemand.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    Allocation of indivisible goods
    L.
    Link: Finding out who will speak
    Upcoming
    Other references
    Tanenbaum-Wetherall refers to:
    Computer Networks, 5th edition,
    S. Shapley and M. Shubik, “The assignment game I: The core,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 111–130, 1971.
    R. Kranton and D. Minehart, “Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks,” Review of Economic Design, 2000.
    R. E. Kranton and D. F. Minehart, “A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks,” The American Economic Review, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 485–508, Jun. 2001.
    L. Blume, D. Easley, and
    Tanenbaum, David J. M. Kleinberg, “Trading networks with price-setting agents,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2009.
    Divisible goods
    S. M. Kakade, M. Kearns, and L. E. Ortiz, “Graphical Economics,” presented at the International Conference on Learning Theory (COLT), Berlin, Heidelberg, 2004, vol. 3120, no. 2, pp. 17–32. (Also appeared as S. M. Kakade, M. Kearns, L. E. Ortiz, R. Pemantle, and S. Suri, “Economic properties of social networks,” Advances in Neural Information Processing
    Wetherall, Prentice Hall, 2011
    ISBN-10: 0132126958, ISBN-13: 978-132126953
    Peterson-Davie refers to:
    Computer Networks, A
    Systems (NIPS), pp. 633–640, 2004. and as S. Kakade, M. Kearns,Approach, 5th edition, L. Ortiz, and R. Pemantle, “The economics of social networks,” presented at the The 15th Annual International Conference on Game Theory, 2004.)
    Other Results Explained in Class:
    M. Corominas-Bosch, “Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 115, no. 1, pp. 35–77, Mar. 2004.
    C. L. Guzmán, “Price Competition on Network,” working paper, 2011.
    M. Babaioff, B. Lucier, and N. Nisan, “Bertrand networks,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    Further Reading & Recents Works:
    M. Babaioff, N. Nisan, and E. Pavlov, “Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 660–684, Jul. 2009.
    Part B.2 - The theory of social goods
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    November 13th
    Motivations, Definitions
    Procurement, Purchase,
    Income elasticity of demand, normal goods
    November 20th
    Outcome of Social Good games
    Adjacency matrix and Bonacich centrality
    Proof of Unicity of equilibrium under network normality
    November 27th
    Provision of Social Goods
    Redistribution, Neutrality principle
    Proof it holds for regular networks
    December 4th
    Catch-up and other
    Social goods with complements
    Monopolist pricing
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-5SocialGoods.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    Various scenarios of social goods
    Y. Bramoullé and R. Kranton, “Public goods in networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 135, no. 1, pp. 478–494, Jul. 2006.
    Y. Bramoullé, R. Kranton, and M. D'Amours, “Strategic interaction and networks,” American Economic Review (forthcoming), 2013.
    Provision, tax and neutrality
    T. Bergstrom, L. Blume, and H. Varian, “On the private provision of public goods,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 25–49, Feb. 1986.
    N. Allouch, “On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks,” working paper, 2012.
    Other Results Explained in Class:
    More examples of public goods
    C. Ballester, A. Calvó-Armengol, and Y. Zenou, “Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player,” Econometrica, vol. 74, no. 5, pp. 1403–1417, Sep. 2006.
    C. Ghiglino and S. Goyal, “Keeping up with the neighbors: social interaction in a market economy,” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 90–119, 2010.
    Pricing a social good
    O. Candogan, K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar, “Optimal pricing in networks with externalities,” Operations Research, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 883–905, 2012.
    F. Bloch and N. Quérou, “Pricing in social networks,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 80, pp. 243–261, Jul. 2013.
    M. Feldman,
    Peterson, Bruce Davie, Morgan Kaufmann, 2011
    ISBN: 9780123850591
    Bertsekas-Gallager refers to:
    Data Networks, 2th edition,
    D. Kempe, B. Lucier, andBertsekas, R. P. Leme, “Pricing public goods for private sale,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    Further Reading & Recents Works:
    Variants of social good games: incomplete information, endogenous network
    A. Galeotti, S. Goyal, M. O. Jackson, F. Vega-Redondo, and L. Yariv, “Network games,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 218–244, 2010.
    A. Galeotti and S. Goyal, “The law of the few,” American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 4, pp. 1468–1492, 2010.
    More on the provision of social goods
    N. Allouch, “The Cost of Segregation in Social Networks,” SSRN Journal, 2013.
    M. Elliott and B. Golub, “A network approach to public goods,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    Pricing a social spread of influence
    J. Hartline, V. Mirrokni, and M. Sundararajan, “Optimal marketing strategies over social networks,” presented at the WWW '08: Proceeding of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web, New York, New York, USA, 2008, pp. 189–198.
    D. Arthur, R. Motwani, A. Sharma, and Y. Xu, “Pricing strategies for viral marketing on social networks,” WINE '09: Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, pp. 101–112, 2009.
    H. Akhlaghpour, M. Ghodsi, N. Haghpanah, V. Mirrokni, H. Mahini, and A. Nikzad, “Optimal iterative pricing over social networks,” presented at the WINE '10: Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics, 2010, pp. 415–423.
    V. Mirrokni, S. Roch, and M. Sundararajan, “On Fixed-Price Marketing for Goods with Positive Network Externalities.,” WINE '12: Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, Dec. 2012.
    Variants of spread of influence
    Y. Singer, “How to win friends and influence people, truthfully: influence maximization mechanisms for social networks,” WSDM '12: Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining, pp. 733–742, 2012.
    N. Alon, I. Gamzu, and M. Tennenholtz, “Optimizing budget allocation among channels and influencers,” presented at the WWW '12: Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web, 2012.
    L. Seeman and Y. Singer, “Adaptive Seeding in Social Networks,” FOCS '13: Proceedings of the 43th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
    More recent works
    M. Wunder, S. Suri, and D. J. Watts, “Empirical agent based models of cooperation in public goods games,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    N. Alon, Y. Mansour, and M. Tenneholtz, “Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networks,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    Gallager, Prentice Hall, 1992
    ISBN-10: 0132009161, ISBN-13: 978-0132009164

    (view changes)
    6:58 pm

Friday, December 13

  1. page Detailed Content edited ... Date & Title Important notions/methods Readings and Materials November 13th Motivat…
    ...
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    Readings and Materials
    November 13th
    Motivations, Definitions
    The different scenarios of public good
    Procurement, Purchase,
    ...
    of demand,
    Normal
    normal goods and Network normality
    November 20th
    ...
    Social Good gamegames
    Adjacency matrix, Propertiesmatrix and Bonacich
    ...
    of equilibrium under network normality
    November 27th
    Provision of social goodsSocial Goods
    Redistribution, Neutrality principle
    Proof it holds for regular networks
    December 4th
    Other aspect of social goodsCatch-up and other
    Social goods with complements, Monopolistcomplements
    Monopolist
    pricing
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-5SocialGoods.pdf} ,
    (view changes)
    8:53 am
  2. page Detailed Content edited ... Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes Main References: ... scenarios of public social goods …
    ...
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    ...
    scenarios of publicsocial goods
    Y. Bramoullé and R. Kranton, “Public goods in networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 135, no. 1, pp. 478–494, Jul. 2006.
    Y. Bramoullé, R. Kranton, and M. D'Amours, “Strategic interaction and networks,” American Economic Review (forthcoming), 2013.
    Analysis of outcomes
    N. Allouch, “On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks,” working paper, 2012.

    Provision, tax and neutrality
    T. Bergstrom, L. Blume, and H. Varian, “On the private provision of public goods,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 25–49, Feb. 1986.
    N. Allouch, “On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks,” working paper, 2012.
    Other Results Explained in Class:
    More examples of public goods
    C. Ballester, A. Calvó-Armengol, and Y. Zenou, “Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player,” Econometrica, vol. 74, no. 5, pp. 1403–1417, Sep. 2006.
    C. Ghiglino and S. Goyal, “Keeping up with the neighbors: social interaction in a market economy,” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 90–119, 2010.

    Pricing a social good
    O. Candogan, K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar, “Optimal pricing in networks with externalities,” Operations Research, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 883–905, 2012.
    F. Bloch and N. Quérou, “Pricing in social networks,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 80, pp. 243–261, Jul. 2013.
    Other Results Explained in Class:
    C. Ballester, A. Calvó-Armengol,
    M. Feldman, D. Kempe, B. Lucier, and Y. Zenou, “Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player,” Econometrica, vol. 74, no. 5, pp. 1403–1417, Sep. 2006.
    C. Ghiglino and S. Goyal, “Keeping up with
    R. P. Leme, “Pricing public goods for private sale,” presented at the neighbors: social interaction in a market economy,” JournalEC '13: Proceedings of the European Economic Association, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 90–119, 2010.fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    Further Reading & Recents Works:
    Variants of social good games: incomplete information, endogenous network
    A. Galeotti, S. Goyal, M. O. Jackson, F. Vega-Redondo, and L. Yariv, “Network games,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 218–244, 2010.
    A. Galeotti and S. Goyal, “The law of the few,” American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 4, pp. 1468–1492, 2010.
    M. Wunder, S. Suri, and D. J. Watts, “Empirical agent based modelsMore on the provision of cooperation in publicsocial goods games,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings
    N. Allouch, “The Cost
    of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce,Segregation in Social Networks,” SSRN Journal, 2013.
    M. Elliott and B. Golub, “A network approach to public goods,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    M. Feldman, D. Kempe, B. Lucier, and R. P. Leme, “Pricing public goods for private sale,” presented at the EC '13: ProceedingsPricing a social spread of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.influence
    J. Hartline, V. Mirrokni, and M. Sundararajan, “Optimal marketing strategies over social networks,” presented at the WWW '08: Proceeding of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web, New York, New York, USA, 2008, pp. 189–198.
    Y. Singer, “How to win friends and influence people, truthfully: influence maximization mechanisms for social networks,” WSDM '12: Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining, pp. 733–742, 2012.
    N. Alon, I. Gamzu, and M. Tennenholtz, “Optimizing budget allocation among channels and influencers,” presented at the WWW '12: Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web, 2012.
    Other Results Explained in Class:

    D. Arthur, R. Motwani, A. Sharma, and Y. Xu, “Pricing strategies for viral marketing on social networks,” WINE '09: Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, pp. 101–112, 2009.
    H. Akhlaghpour, M. Ghodsi, N. Haghpanah, V. Mirrokni, H. Mahini, and A. Nikzad, “Optimal iterative pricing over social networks,” presented at the WINE '10: Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics, 2010, pp. 415–423.
    Further Reading & Recents Works:
    N. Alon, Y. Mansour, and M. Tenneholtz, “Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networks,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.

    V. Mirrokni, S. Roch, and M. Sundararajan, “On Fixed-Price Marketing for Goods with Positive Network Externalities.,” WINE '12: Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, Dec. 2012.
    Variants of spread of influence
    Y. Singer, “How to win friends and influence people, truthfully: influence maximization mechanisms for social networks,” WSDM '12: Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining, pp. 733–742, 2012.
    N. Alon, I. Gamzu, and M. Tennenholtz, “Optimizing budget allocation among channels and influencers,” presented at the WWW '12: Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web, 2012.

    L. Seeman and Y. Singer, “Adaptive Seeding in Social Networks,” FOCS '13: Proceedings of the 43th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
    More recent works
    M. Wunder, S. Suri, and D. J. Watts, “Empirical agent based models of cooperation in public goods games,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    N. Alon, Y. Mansour, and M. Tenneholtz, “Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networks,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.

    (view changes)
    8:50 am
  3. page Detailed Content edited ... Further Reading & Recents Works: M. Babaioff, N. Nisan, and E. Pavlov, “Mechanisms for a …
    ...
    Further Reading & Recents Works:
    M. Babaioff, N. Nisan, and E. Pavlov, “Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 660–684, Jul. 2009.
    ...
    B.2 - Provisioning aThe theory of social goodgoods
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    Readings and Materials
    November 13th
    PublicMotivations, Definitions
    The different scenarios of public good
    Procurement, Purchase,
    Income elasticity of demand,
    Normal
    goods (I)
    Global goods, Neutrality, Redistribution
    Slides:
    Upcoming
    and Network normality
    November 20th
    PublicOutcome of Social Good game
    Adjacency matrix, Properties and Bonacich centrality
    Proof of Unicity of equilibrium
    November 27th
    Provision of social
    goods (II)
    Bonacich Centrality,
    Notes:

    Redistribution, Neutrality principle
    Proof it holds for regular networks
    December 4th
    Other aspect of social goods
    Social goods with complements, Monopolist pricing

    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-5SocialGoods.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    T. Bergstrom, L. Blume, and H. Varian, “On the private provisionVarious scenarios of public goods,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 25–49, Feb. 1986.goods
    Y. Bramoullé and R. Kranton, “Public goods in networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 135, no. 1, pp. 478–494, Jul. 2006.
    Y. Bramoullé, R. Kranton, and M. D'Amours, “Strategic interaction and networks,” American Economic Review (forthcoming), 2013.
    Analysis of outcomes
    N. Allouch, “On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks,” working paper, 2012.
    M. ElliottProvision, tax and B. Golub, “A network approach toneutrality
    T. Bergstrom, L. Blume, and H. Varian, “On the private provision of
    public goods,” presented at the EC '13: ProceedingsJournal of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce,Public Economics, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 25–49, Feb. 1986.
    Pricing a social good
    O. Candogan, K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar, “Optimal pricing in networks with externalities,” Operations Research, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 883–905, 2012.
    F. Bloch and N. Quérou, “Pricing in social networks,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 80, pp. 243–261, Jul.
    2013.
    Other Results Explained in Class:
    C. Ballester, A. Calvó-Armengol, and Y. Zenou, “Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player,” Econometrica, vol. 74, no. 5, pp. 1403–1417, Sep. 2006.
    C. Ghiglino and S. Goyal, “Keeping up with the neighbors: social interaction in a market economy,” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 90–119, 2010.
    A. Galeotti and S. Goyal, “The law of the few,” American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 4, pp. 1468–1492, 2010.
    Further Reading & Recents Works:
    A. Galeotti, S. Goyal, M. O. Jackson, F. Vega-Redondo, and L. Yariv, “Network games,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 218–244, 2010.
    A. Galeotti and S. Goyal, “The law of the few,” American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 4, pp. 1468–1492, 2010.
    M. Wunder, S. Suri, and D. J. Watts, “Empirical agent based models of cooperation in public goods games,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    Part B.3 - Monetizing a social good
    Date & Title
    Important notions/methods
    Readings
    M. Elliott and Materials
    November 27th
    Monopolist with externalities
    Global goods, Neutrality, Redistribution
    Slides:
    Upcoming
    December 4th
    Pricing a cascade
    Threshold models
    B. Golub, “A network approach to public goods,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    M. Feldman, D. Kempe, B. Lucier,
    and independent cascade
    Notes:
    Upcoming
    Main References:
    O. Candogan, K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar, “Optimal pricing in networks with externalities,” Operations Research, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 883–905, 2012.
    F. Bloch and N. Quérou,
    R. P. Leme, “Pricing in social networks,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 80, pp. 243–261, Jul.public goods for private sale,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    J. Hartline, V. Mirrokni, and M. Sundararajan, “Optimal marketing strategies over social networks,” presented at the WWW '08: Proceeding of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web, New York, New York, USA, 2008, pp. 189–198.
    Y. Singer, “How to win friends and influence people, truthfully: influence maximization mechanisms for social networks,” WSDM '12: Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining, pp. 733–742, 2012.
    ...
    H. Akhlaghpour, M. Ghodsi, N. Haghpanah, V. Mirrokni, H. Mahini, and A. Nikzad, “Optimal iterative pricing over social networks,” presented at the WINE '10: Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics, 2010, pp. 415–423.
    Further Reading & Recents Works:
    M. Feldman, D. Kempe, B. Lucier, and R. P. Leme, “Pricing public goods for private sale,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    N. Alon, Y. Mansour, and M. Tenneholtz, “Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networks,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
    V. Mirrokni, S. Roch, and M. Sundararajan, “On Fixed-Price Marketing for Goods with Positive Network Externalities.,” WINE '12: Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, Dec. 2012.
    (view changes)
    8:41 am

Thursday, December 12

  1. page Detailed Content edited ... Notes: Materials: ... materials: Slides {SNE13-5SocialGood.pdf} {SNE13-5SocialGoods.pdf…
    ...
    Notes:
    Materials:
    ...
    materials: Slides {SNE13-5SocialGood.pdf}{SNE13-5SocialGoods.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes
    Main References:
    (view changes)
    12:09 pm
  2. 12:08 pm
  3. page Detailed Content edited ... Bonacich Centrality, Notes: Materials: Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-5SocialGood.…
    ...
    Bonacich Centrality,
    Notes:
    Materials:
    Presentation materials: Slides {SNE13-5SocialGood.pdf} ,
    Notes and Proofs: Lecture Notes

    Main References:
    T. Bergstrom, L. Blume, and H. Varian, “On the private provision of public goods,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 25–49, Feb. 1986.
    (view changes)
    12:03 pm

More