On this page, you find all the materials (slides, handouts, assignments) organized chronologically. Most importantly, the columns "Important notions/methods" summarize for each lectures the particular definition and method that you need to digest, and will be used in assignments and exams.

Preliminary


Date & Title
Important notions/methods
Readings and Materials
September 4th
Welcome to the class
Motivation for new works on social network economics
What's in the class, and should you take it?
Slides


Part A - Opinion and Influence Dynamics


Part A.1 - The crowd is wise


Date & Title
Important notions/methods
September 11th
Consensus, Social learning
Terminology and Results
Epidemics, Influence, Opinion
Iterated Consensus, Naive learning
September 18th
Wisdom of the crowd
Terminology and Results
Uniformly prominent family,
Balanced, Minimal Dispersion

Materials:

Main References:
  1. M. H. Degroot, “Reaching a Consensus,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 69, no. 345, pp. 118–121, Mar. 1974.
  2. P. M. DeMarzo, D. Vayanos, and J. Zwiebel, “Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 118, no. 3, pp. 909–968, Aug. 2003.
  3. B. Golub and M. O. Jackson, “Naive learning in social networks and the wisdom of crowds,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 112–149, 2010.

Part A.2 - The crowd can't seem to agree


Date & Title
Important notions/methods
September 25th
Manipulation
Terminology and Results
Biased and Stubborn agents,
Agreement as minimizing cost
October 2nd
Analysis of manipulation
Laplacian, Random Walk and Hitting time

Materials:

Main References:
  1. J. Ghaderi and R. Srikant, “Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks: A Local Interaction Game with Stubborn Agents,” ACC '13: Proceedings of the American Control Conference, vol. cs.GT. 2013.
  2. D. Bindel, J. M. Kleinberg, and S. Oren, “How Bad is Forming Your Own Opinion?,” Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on, pp. 57–66, 2011.

Other results explained in class:
  1. D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, and A. ParandehGheibi, “Spread of (mis) information in social networks,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 70, no. 2, pp. 194–227, 2010.
  2. D. Acemoglu, G. Como, F. Fagnani, and A. Ozdaglar, “Opinion fluctuations and disagreement in social networks,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 1–27, 2013.
  3. E. Yildiz, D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, A. Saberi, and A. Scaglione, "Binary Opinion Dynamics with Stubborn Agents," ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2013. (previously appeared as “Discrete opinion dynamics with stubborn agents,” SSRN 1744113, 2011).

Further Reading & Recent works:
  1. K. Bhawalkar, S. Gollapudi, and K. Munagala, “Coevolutionary opinion formation games,” presented at the STOC '13: Proceedings of the 45th annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing, 2013.
  2. F. Chierichetti, J. M. Kleinberg, and S. Oren, “On discrete preferences and coordination,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.

Part A.3 - The crowd is selective


Date & Title
Important notions/methods
October 9th
Information Selection
Homophily, Biased assimilation, Fragmentation, Polarization
Influence System
October 16th
Convergence of influence system
Total s-energy, Potential function

Materials:

Main References:
  1. C. G. Lord, L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper, “Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence.,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 37, no. 11, p. 2098, Nov. 1979.
  2. J. Lorenz, “A stabilization theorem for dynamics of continuous opinions,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 355, no. 1, pp. 217–223, 2005.
  3. A. Bhattacharyya, M. Braverman, B. Chazelle, and H. L. Nguyen, “On the convergence of the Hegselmann-Krause system,” presented at the ITCS '13: Proceedings of the 4th conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2013.

Other Results Explained in Class:
  1. B. Chazelle, “The total s-energy of a multiagent system,” SIAM J. Control Optim., vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 1680–1706, 2011.

Further Reading & Recents Works:

  • On polarization dynamics and the effects of recommender systems
  1. P. Dandekar, A. Goel, and D. T. Lee, “Biased assimilation, homophily, and the dynamics of polarization.,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 110, no. 15, pp. 5791–5796, Apr. 2013.

  • On migration-cultural adoption
  1. R. Axelrod, “The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with Local Convergence and Global Polarization,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 203–226, Apr. 1997.
  2. D. Kempe, J. M. Kleinberg, S. Oren, and A. Slivkins, “Selection and influence in cultural dynamics,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.

  • On network with antagonistic relations and structural balance:
  1. S. Marvel, S. Strogatz, and J. M. Kleinberg, “Energy landscape of social balance,” Physical review letters, vol. 103, no. 19, p. 198701, 2009.
  2. S. A. Marvel, J. M. Kleinberg, R. Kleinberg, and S. H. Strogatz, “Continuous-time model of structural balance,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 108, no. 5, pp. 1771–1776, 2011.
  3. C. Altafini, “Consensus Problems on Networks With Antagonistic Interactions,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 935–946, Apr. 2013.
  4. G. Shi, A. Proutiere, M. Johansson, J. S. Baras, and K. H. Johansson, “The Evolution of Beliefs over Signed Social Networks,” arXiv.org, Jul. 2013.


Part B - Graphical Economies


Part B.1 - Trading with network constraints


Date & Title
Important notions/methods
Readings and Materials
October 24th
Allocating Indivisible Goods over Networks
Matching Market, Buyer-Seller Network, Trading Agents
October 31th
Allocating Divisible Goods over Networks
Some words on elastic demand
Arrow Debreu Theorem, Graphical Economies,
Bertrand Competition

Materials:


Main References:

  • Allocation of indivisible goods
  1. L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, “The assignment game I: The core,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 111–130, 1971.
  2. R. Kranton and D. Minehart, “Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks,” Review of Economic Design, 2000.
  3. R. E. Kranton and D. F. Minehart, “A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks,” The American Economic Review, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 485–508, Jun. 2001.
  4. L. Blume, D. Easley, and J. M. Kleinberg, “Trading networks with price-setting agents,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2009.

  • Divisible goods
  1. S. M. Kakade, M. Kearns, and L. E. Ortiz, “Graphical Economics,” presented at the International Conference on Learning Theory (COLT), Berlin, Heidelberg, 2004, vol. 3120, no. 2, pp. 17–32. (Also appeared as S. M. Kakade, M. Kearns, L. E. Ortiz, R. Pemantle, and S. Suri, “Economic properties of social networks,” Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS), pp. 633–640, 2004. and as S. Kakade, M. Kearns, L. Ortiz, and R. Pemantle, “The economics of social networks,” presented at the The 15th Annual International Conference on Game Theory, 2004.)

Other Results Explained in Class:
  1. M. Corominas-Bosch, “Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 115, no. 1, pp. 35–77, Mar. 2004.
  2. C. L. Guzmán, “Price Competition on Network,” working paper, 2011.
  3. M. Babaioff, B. Lucier, and N. Nisan, “Bertrand networks,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.

Further Reading & Recents Works:
  1. M. Babaioff, N. Nisan, and E. Pavlov, “Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 660–684, Jul. 2009.

Part B.2 - The theory of social goods


Date & Title
Important notions/methods
November 13th
Motivations, Definitions
Procurement, Purchase,
Income elasticity of demand, normal goods
November 20th
Outcome of Social Good games
Adjacency matrix and Bonacich centrality
Proof of Unicity of equilibrium under network normality
November 27th
Provision of Social Goods
Redistribution, Neutrality principle
Proof it holds for regular networks
December 4th
Catch-up and other
Social goods with complements
Monopolist pricing

Materials:

Main References:

  • Various scenarios of social goods
  1. Y. Bramoullé and R. Kranton, “Public goods in networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 135, no. 1, pp. 478–494, Jul. 2006.
  2. Y. Bramoullé, R. Kranton, and M. D'Amours, “Strategic interaction and networks,” American Economic Review (forthcoming), 2013.

  • Provision, tax and neutrality
  1. T. Bergstrom, L. Blume, and H. Varian, “On the private provision of public goods,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 25–49, Feb. 1986.
  2. N. Allouch, “On the Private Provision of Public Goods on Networks,” working paper, 2012.

Other Results Explained in Class:

  • More examples of public goods
  1. C. Ballester, A. Calvó-Armengol, and Y. Zenou, “Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player,” Econometrica, vol. 74, no. 5, pp. 1403–1417, Sep. 2006.
  2. C. Ghiglino and S. Goyal, “Keeping up with the neighbors: social interaction in a market economy,” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 90–119, 2010.

  • Pricing a social good
  1. O. Candogan, K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar, “Optimal pricing in networks with externalities,” Operations Research, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 883–905, 2012.
  2. F. Bloch and N. Quérou, “Pricing in social networks,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 80, pp. 243–261, Jul. 2013.
  3. M. Feldman, D. Kempe, B. Lucier, and R. P. Leme, “Pricing public goods for private sale,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.

Further Reading & Recents Works:

  • Variants of social good games: incomplete information, endogenous network
  1. A. Galeotti, S. Goyal, M. O. Jackson, F. Vega-Redondo, and L. Yariv, “Network games,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 218–244, 2010.
  2. A. Galeotti and S. Goyal, “The law of the few,” American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 4, pp. 1468–1492, 2010.

  • More on the provision of social goods
  1. N. Allouch, “The Cost of Segregation in Social Networks,” SSRN Journal, 2013.
  2. M. Elliott and B. Golub, “A network approach to public goods,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.

  • Pricing a social spread of influence
  1. J. Hartline, V. Mirrokni, and M. Sundararajan, “Optimal marketing strategies over social networks,” presented at the WWW '08: Proceeding of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web, New York, New York, USA, 2008, pp. 189–198.
  2. D. Arthur, R. Motwani, A. Sharma, and Y. Xu, “Pricing strategies for viral marketing on social networks,” WINE '09: Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, pp. 101–112, 2009.
  3. H. Akhlaghpour, M. Ghodsi, N. Haghpanah, V. Mirrokni, H. Mahini, and A. Nikzad, “Optimal iterative pricing over social networks,” presented at the WINE '10: Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics, 2010, pp. 415–423.
  4. V. Mirrokni, S. Roch, and M. Sundararajan, “On Fixed-Price Marketing for Goods with Positive Network Externalities.,” WINE '12: Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, Dec. 2012.

  • Variants of spread of influence
  1. Y. Singer, “How to win friends and influence people, truthfully: influence maximization mechanisms for social networks,” WSDM '12: Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining, pp. 733–742, 2012.
  2. N. Alon, I. Gamzu, and M. Tennenholtz, “Optimizing budget allocation among channels and influencers,” presented at the WWW '12: Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web, 2012.
  3. L. Seeman and Y. Singer, “Adaptive Seeding in Social Networks,” FOCS '13: Proceedings of the 43th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.

  • More recent works
  1. M. Wunder, S. Suri, and D. J. Watts, “Empirical agent based models of cooperation in public goods games,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.
  2. N. Alon, Y. Mansour, and M. Tenneholtz, “Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networks,” presented at the EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2013.